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Testing the Blending 
 
“Like a dull actor now / I have forgot my part (…).” 
Shakespeare, Coriolanus, Act 5, Scene 3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Some cognitive accounts of the experience of theatre audiences (e.g., Fauconnier & 
Turner, 2002, McConachie, 2008) have been using the notion of “conceptual blending” 
in order to describe the way spectators combine distinct objective elements of a given 
actor – his voice, walk, gestures, or even his overall persona, including the memory of 
her previous performances – in order to build up their concept of the fictional character 
that is being played. This is both an exercise connected to the very core of human 
cognition, based on the ability to combine different perceptions and turn them into 
abstract concepts (Edelman & Tononi, 2000) and a deeply entertaining practice, already 
present in the game of role-playing adopted by children after two years old. Blending, 
and particularly theatrical blending, is highly selective and it is up to each spectator to 
choose which characteristics of the actor belong to the conceptualization of the fictional 
character and which are not. This also makes it possible for the spectator, for instance, to 
actively “ignore” the fact that the character dies at the end of the play or to forget the 
actor’s persona outside the current stage role. Blending is also a dynamic process and 
both actors and spectators will often oscillate in and out of their respective blends. For 
instance, spectators often abandon their actor / character blend so that they may better 
admire this actor’s vocal or gestural prowess.  
 Conceptual blending may also be presented as an alternative theory of theatre 
and a powerful competitor vis-à-vis the usual para-Aristotelian notions of “empathy” or 
“identification”, and Brechtian Verfremdung. Ultimately, it encourages the spectator to 
think about the duplicity that characterizes all theatricality. 
 This description of theatrical experience as akin to a process of conceptual 
integration and assimilation seems to recall other accounts that tend to envisage aesthetic 
appreciation in general as a kind of peculiar linkage of the configurational properties and 
the content. This is the case of Richard Wollheim’s “seeing in”, Robert Hopkins’ 
“collapsed seeing-in” or Gregory Currie’s distinction between “representation-by-origin” 
and representation-by-use”.  According to Currie, photography and film share the same 
possibility for distinguishing between “representation-by-origin” and “representation-by-
use”. A film like Casablanca may represent-by-origin Humphrey Bogart but also 
represents-by-use the fictional character of Rick Blaine. Sometimes what the film 
represents-by-origin is so intrusive that the whole film is marred by what psychologists 
call “pop-out”, i.e., representation-by-origin grabs the spectator’s attention in such a way 
that prevents her from attending the fictional representation-by-use thus producing a 
strong sense of “representational dissonance”. “Pop-out” is also common in theatre, of 
course. An actor’s clumsy misunderstanding of his role, a distractive audience, the super-
star persona of the leading actress may force actors and / or spectators to un-blend the 
actor / character assimilation and remove them from the fictional flow. Accepting the 
parallel with visual depiction, they stop seeing the character in the actor. 
This paper intends to measure the plausibility and the explanatory traction of the 
notion of “conceptual blending” as an account of theatrical experience. First, by 
assessing its novelty as a new definition of what is specific to theatre as an art form, and 
a suitable alternative to Aristotelian and Brechtian conceptions. It seems that by placing 
conceptual integration as the basic theatrical experience and by reviewing role-playing as 
the cognitive foundation of theatre, the concept of blending allows us to reassess the 
importance of emotional empathy, or detachment, in theatre. In a given sense, emotional 
empathy or sympathy become just an ingredient of blending, albeit a very significant one. 
Second, we shall try to place theatrical blending side by side with other theories of art 
(namely, visual art) that portray artistic representation as a a kind of “shuttle” or “fusion” 
between configuration and content. In particular, we propose that theatrical blending 
works as a kind of “seeing in”. More recent developments of Wollheim’s concept – such 
as Bence Nanay’s – will be adapted to the experience of role-playing in order to test 
whether this constitutes a suitable analogy.  
 
2. Conceptual Blending 
 
According to Fauconnier and Turner, “the essence of the operation [of 
conceptual blending] is to construct a partial match between two input mental spaces, to 
project selectively from those inputs into a novel 'blended' mental space, which then 
dynamically develops emergent structure.”1 “Mental space” is a key concept here and it is 																																																								1	Facuconnier	and	Turner,	2003:	58.	
described as an ad hoc “conceptual packet” that we assemble as we think and talk by 
blending together an array of distinct elements taken from previous mental spaces “for 
purposes of local understanding and action.” This blending is described as a three-stages 
process: composition, pattern completion and elaboration, and from the very start the 
activity of theatre spectators and actors is proposed as a quasi-paradigmatic case of 
conceptual blending. For the purpose at hand, I shall concentrate on composition. 
 
2.1. Composition 
 
Conceptual blending in film requires three steps: (1) a selection of characteristics 
of the actual actor (that he is alive, that he moves and talks in certain ways, etc.); (2) some 
knowledge of the fictional character being played (his past history, his present 
motivations, his beliefs regarding other characters, etc.); (3) with the concept of 
“identity” as a sort of template spectators create a new and more complex identity 
merging together the actor and the character, such as Benedict Cumberbatch / Hamlet. 
Something of a similar nature occurs with the actor’s own blending. He chooses 
to draw salient, for instance, his “motor patterns and power of speech” while at the same 
time supresses “his free will and foreknowledge of the situation”: “in the blend he says 
just what the character says and is surprised night after night by the same events.”2 In 
fact, the authors defend that conceptual blending lies at the basis of all role-enacted 
games of make-believe. 
Suppose that we are watching an actor playing a role. The two personas – the 
actor’s physical manifestation and the character’s supposed configuration – constitute 
two distinct mental spaces and each one of these reflect different salient aspects of each 
persona: his age, his height, his regal posture and illocution. The two also share a more 
“generic” space like, for instance, the fact that both are conscious of acting a part or 
simply that the two are involved with theatre. Conceptual blending is initiated when the 
spectator partially matches the two inputs and “projects selectively from these two input 
spaces into a fourth mental space, the blended space.” 
In this new blended space, some features of the actor are selected because they 
are more congruent matches to the spectator’s knowledge of the character (e.g., the 
actor’s youth) and some characteristics of the character are also projected onto the way 
																																																								2	Fauconnier	&	Turner,	2002:	267.	
the actor is perceived and in some extent act as “focusers” for the spectator’s attention.3 
Significantly, many other characteristics pertaining to each one of their mental spaces are 
suppressed, like the fact that this particular actor is already famous for his impersonation 
of other dramatic roles or the fact that the character dies at the end of the play. The 
construal of a third persona becomes emergent in the blend, one that is actively 
responsible for bringing the spectator closer to the fictional flow but may also be 
admired in a more distanced way, as when spectators blend out of the actor / character 
mental space in order to better admire the actor’s technical expertise. 
 
2.2. Characteristics of the blending 
 
To blend in and out of conceptual compositions is also a deeply entertaining 
practice. Blending, and particularly theatrical blending, is highly selective: each actor and 
each spectator involved in conceptual blending is able to choose which characteristics of 
the actor belong to the conceptualization of the fictional character and which are not in a 
kind of aspect-seeing that makes salient some features of the actor and overshadows 
others. Another important characteristic of conceptual blending lies in the ability of 
concentrating on the “moment-to-moment playing of the character”4, for instance, by 
actively “ignoring” the fact that the character dies at the end of the play or to forget the 
actor’s persona outside the current stage role. Considering the point of view of the 
spectator, usually, this kind of blending is used in order to better involve the spectator in 
the fictional flow providing a meaningful gathering of the actor’s characteristics towards 
the manifestation of the fictional character. That way, even the most histrionic and ham 
actor can be turned into a suitable and unexpected implementation of a given character.  
Throughout this blending in and out, spectators develop an acute sense of the 
twofoldness intrinsic to role-playing and this awareness can even be extended to props, 
spoken dialogue and the very nature of plays.  
Naturally, social values and cultural ethos also affect the blend of character and 
role. Shakespeare, for one, used this cultural saturation by weaving complex innuendos 																																																								3	“I	once	saw	a	performance	of	The	Elephant	Man	(…)	where	one	of	the	cast	collapsed	on	the	floor.	[A]	doctor	who	happened	to	be	in	the	audience	(...)	had	at	once	gone	backstage	to	help.	After	examining	the	patient	he	diagnosed	him	(...)	with	simple	hyperventilation	–	then	turned	to	Nicky	[who	played	the	role	of	a	doctor	in	the	play]	and	asked	him	with	courteous	deference	if	he	agreed.”	Michael	Frayn,	2010:	xi.		4	McConachie,	2013:	24.	
about the sexual implications and ambiguities of male actors playing female characters, as 
ordained by Elizabethan law. In Twelfth Night, the female character of Viola dresses up as 
a boy – Cesario – so that she may ask the Duke for a job as male page. And it is as 
Cesario that the character would appear to her / his audience for most of the 
performance, thus becoming much more like the young actor actually performing the 
part and defying the spectator’s ability to blend in and out of the juxtaposed triad male 
actor / Viola / Cesario. “I am not that I play”, says the triad when asked by Olivia if he 
is a “comedian”. The alluring nature of this complex and entertaining exercise is quite 
evident. The spectator is given the chance to move between different temporary blends. 
The most immediate blend would combine the male actor with the character Viola; a 
second blend – the one that would most aptly defy the ability of the spectator to stay 
within the fictional flow - would correlate the male actor and Cesario; and a third blend, - 
the “two step blend”, as McConachie calls it5 - would require imagining that the male 
actor is playing a female character who in turn is impersonating a male character. Adding 
to the complexity of the exercise, the spectator is required to integrate the fact that Viola 
is a fictionally existing character – with the wrong gender - while Cesario is a fictionally 
non-existing character – but with the right gender. 
 
2.3. Predecessors 
 
Conceptual blending seems to echo some of the jargon proposed by Edward 
Bullough on his famous and theatre-inspired theory of psychical distance. Three major 
options are available in the continuum of aesthetic transaction. Spectators may (a) decide 
to “blend-out” actor from character and concentrate on the actor’s exuberance, 
distancing themselves from the fictional flow (to the point of risking an “over-
distancing”); (b) engage fully with the character and sub-distancing themselves to the 
point of forgetting the actor’s performance;6 (c) reach an ideal balance between the 
actor’s physical presence and awareness of the character’s personality in a suitable blend 
– “psychical distance”.  																																																								5	Cf.	McConachie,	2008:	194.	6	As	an	extreme	example	of	“sub-distance”	in	conceptual	blending,	one	could	quote	the	intriguing	case	of	some	Britons	in	the	1980s	who	suffered	from	nervous	depression	because	they	failed	to	win	the	lottery	even	though	they	knew	that	the	odds	were	extremely	slim:	“[B]etween	the	purchase	of	the	ticket	and	the	drawing	of	the	winner,	these	victims	had	fantasized	(...)	about	what	they	would	do	upon	winning	the	lottery.	The	actual	lottery	made	them	lose	everything	they	had	acquired	in	the	fantasy	world.	In	that	world,	they	did	indeed	suffer	a	severe	loss.”	(Fauconnier	and	Turner,	2002:	231).	
Conceptual blending is also in perfect consonance with what phenomenologist 
Bert O. States named “the three pronominal modes” of the actor-spectator relationship.7 
The self-expressive mode refers to the way actors choose to show off their virtuosity, 
relaxing a proper manifestation of the character; in the representational mode the actor 
disappears behind the character; and in the collaborative mode actors interact actively 
with the audience, suggesting a kind of communitarian belonging. Oscillating between 
admiration of virtuosity and engagement with fictional characterization, the spectator 
prepares different blends adding more actor and less character, or vice-versa. 
Conceptual blending is also at the core of David Saltz’s conception of theatre as 
“the actual embodiment of alternate structures of reality”.8 Saltz’s main point is that 
instead of what semiology and phenomenology defend, theatre spectators are not usually 
engaged in extracting meaning from the play, which would require them to perceive any 
production as a sign of something else. Rather, spectators watch the play by seeing the 
actors and props in a different mode, or by using them differently. To illustrate his point, 
Saltz quotes Gombrich: “If the child calls a stick a horse (…) the stick is neither a sign 
signifying the concept horse nor is it a portrait of an individual horse. By its capacity of 
serving as a ‘substitute’ the stick becomes a horse in its own right.”9 According to Saltz, 
and in perfect consonance with Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual blending, Gombrich 
was describing artistic creation “as an act of bringing objects into the world rather than 
imitating or referring to existing objects.”10 What this means in a theatrical context is that 
spectators use fiction in two complementary modes. First, they go from the narrative to 
the performance by following the given set of ‘prescriptions to imagine’ (“infiction”). 
The way Saltz describes this process is quite similar to that of conceptual blending. The 
actor builds up “a fictional schema that structures the event” and the spectator perceives 
the narrative not as a third term hovering above the performance but as totally 
permeating the performance, which becomes “the primary focus of attention”. Saltz 
equates infiction with Wittgenstein’s proposal that the expression in the face drawing 
inheres in the drawing, and finds a correspondence in Peirce’s notion of “secondness”, 
i.e., when there are only two terms involved: the spectator and the performance. 
Secondly, spectators may move away from the performance into the narrative: outfiction 
is the name Saltz proposes for this “metaphorical redescription” of the performance, i.e., 																																																								7	Cf.	McConachie,	2008:	46.	8	Saltz,	2006:	218.	9	Saltz,	2006:	209.	10	Saltz,	2006:	210.	
the spectatorial or critical interpretation of the play. Outfiction constitutes the semiotic 
step out of the blending and is similar to the description of the face in Wittgenstein’s 
example. It also corresponds to Peirce’s notion of interpretative “thirdness”, i.e., the 
emergence of three terms: a sign (the play), its object (the performance) and its 
interpretant (the sign created by the spectator and read off of the performance of the 
play). Only then, the narrative content is extracted from the performance and a triadic 
relationship between spectator, performance and fictional world is created.  
 
2.4. Consequences 
 
a) The moral consequence 
 
What are the implications of conceptual blending for the emotional involvement 
and moral commitment of spectators regarding the fictional character? If blending is a 
two-way process and actors may also be seen as acquiring some of the characteristics of 
the roles they’re playing then empathy could be assessed by considering the 
consequences that the characters predicaments may have on the psychology of the actor 
carrying the role. For instance, there are several actors who have performed the role of 
Jesus Christ on film (e.g. Jim Caviezel or Enrique Irazoqui) who have confessed some 
psychological disturbance after playing that part. Naturally, this concern will affect the 
spectator the more she is aware with the actor’s actual persona. This concern for the 
actor-in-character may indeed become a stylistic tool in film and should be distinguished 
from the Socratic fear that imitating someone can increasingly become natural – “so 
much so that one can begin to take on characteristics of the person one is imitating.”11 
Furthermore, if imagining to be someone else – such as the actor per trade and the 
spectator per empathy do – is perceived as a condition for pitying someone, then, 
through moving in and out of the actor / character blend, spectators may become truly 
mesmerized – and emotionally affected – by the way an actor expresses full 
comprehension of a character’s personality. Awareness of the actor’s ductility or 
adaptability to quite distinct roles may play an important part in this respect. 
 
b) The emotional consequence 
 																																																								11	Stern,	2008:	116.	
Blending also provides an interesting basis for re-examining Diderot’s principle 
according to which there is never a correspondence between the emotions expressed by 
the actor and the emotions actually felt by the actor, actually more concerned with 
manipulating the tools of his trade than being moved by the character’s passions. The 
juxtaposition of the actor’s expressiveness and the character’s emotional life is also a 
result from the blending.  
 
c) The fictional consequence 
 
Apart from its cognitive justification, blending is a refreshing concept also 
because it may be used as an alternative explanation vis-à-vis the usual para-Aristotelian 
notions of “empathy” or “identification”, and Brechtian Verfremdung. In a way, it 
acknowledges both attitudes as constitutive of that typical oscillation between 
experiencing the fictional flow, on the one hand, and attention to illusion and artifice, on 
the other.  
It also provides a better description of theatrical experience than all the theories 
that present attention to the fictional flow as a kind of on-off disposition. According to 
these theories – epitomized by Coleridge famous formula about “the suspension of 
disbelief” - the spectator would swing between belief and scepticism in her connection to 
the actor / character. Instead of a “leap of faith”12 that leaves behind the actor to focus 
on the character, conceptual blending puts forth a cumulative conception of theatrical 
experience according to which spectators are constantly combining actor and character. 
Instead of a binary or digital attention, spectators are involved in an exercise with 
different degrees of immersion in the fictional flow within a continuum that goes from 
exclusive attention to the actor to complete awareness of the character. Naturally, 
blending can be an acquired taste and different audiences tend to mix together different 
elements in varying degrees. Sometimes the elements drawn from the actor will be more 
numerous than the character’s contribution, particularly if we are watching a famous star. 
But sometimes the fictional character will constitute the centre of attention as in the case 
where a particularly clumsy or rather unknown actor is on stage. Variations in the blend 
also occur during the production and experienced spectators develop different strategies 
that allow for the creation of a believable blend. 
																																																								12	Cf.	McConachie,	2008:	44.	
Usually, theories of theatrical representation, and semiotic theories in particular, 
have concentrated on the propositional meaning we extract from productions and 
followed exclusively the path from performance to narrative. However much of what is 
significant for us in a theatrical performance is of a non-propositional nature, and is 
clearly perceived when we are involved with conceptual blending. Kendall Walton 
identified a class of what he called “silly questions” in aesthetics much of which – 
significantly, we must add – occur in theatre: “How did Othello, a Moorish general and 
hardly an intellectual, manage to come up with such superb verses on the spur of the 
moment?” or “it is fictional in William Luce’s play The Belle of Amherst that Emily 
Dickinson is an extraordinarily shy person who keeps to herself. Yet she is onstage 
throughout the play, speaking constantly. (…) How can it be fictional that Dickinson 
says all that she does (…) yet fictional that she is not gregarious? Is it fictional that 
Dickinson is and is not gregarious? That she is and is not shy?”13 
 Although these questions may seem plausible from a semiotic standpoint, they 
seldom interrupt the spectator’s attention to the performance. This could prove that 
blending is quite often the main diegetic path followed by the spectator and is quite 
sufficient to sustain a meaningful and rewarding theatrical experience. Actively engaged 
in conceptual blending, the spectator is oblivious of any “silly question”. 
As already mentioned, blending is a dynamic process and both actors and 
spectators will often oscillate in and out of their respective blends and this ability was, to 
some extent, identified by authors such as Coleridge and Stendhal, for whom spectators 
drift in and out of the fictional “spell” not in a binary way away but in varying degrees. 
This ability to move in and out of the fictional flow while still maintaining an aesthetic 
appraisal of the production constitutes one of the most distinctive traits of theatre qua art 
form. And even under the most intense blending experience, as Coleridge writes, “it is at 
all times within [the spectator’s] power to see the thing as it really is.” 14  The 
pervasiveness of this blending and un-blending encourages spectators to reflect on the 
twofoldness that characterizes film. But what kind of twofoldness is this? 
 
3. Twofoldness 
  
Is conceptual blending a kind of twofoldness? 
																																																								13	Walton,	1990:	175-176.	14	Quoted	by	Stern,	2008:	64.	
Arguably because of a semiotic and phenomenological bias, and until very 
recently, theories of theatre haven’t been keen on exploring the active twofoldness or 
doubleness involved in watching a play. On the other hand, however, twofoldness, input 
blending and representational seeing constitute established topics in philosophy of 
painting or visual representation, in general. In order to interrogate the conditions in 
which conceptual blending takes place let us look for assistance in the current discussion 
concerning the concept of “seeing-in”. What follows is an exercise in analogic reasoning. 
We have twofold visual experiences if we are simultaneously aware of both the 
representation of an object and the medium of representation. We see something in a 
painting when we are simultaneously aware of the canvas and the representation of an 
object object. It is, to a fair extent, a conceptual blending, with composition, pattern 
completion and elaboration: two input “mental spaces” share a generic space (e.g., both 
the original model and the canvas are oriented towards the viewer) and there is a 
selective projection from the two input spaces into a blended space. Although the two 
input spaces may share equal importance in seeing-in  – as when the material properties 
of the canvas interact and assist the viewer to see the represented object, as in some 
paintings by Leonardo da Vinci or Antoni Tàpies -, it is usually an unilateral experience 
in which the properties of the canvas serve the emergence of the represented object: we see 
the object in the canvas. What this entails is that, in painting, to blend out of the object-
being-represented (which is not the same thing as the represented object, the latter being 
an element of the original input mental space and the former the object in the blended 
space) in order to concentrate on the material qualities of the canvas does not seem to 
amount, per se, to an aesthetic attention of the canvas. Whereas when we see Hamlet in 
Cumberbatch, to blend out of the character in order to admire the actor’s prowess is still 
within the latitude of an aesthetic experience.  
For a number of years there persisted a consensus encircling the idea that the 
experience of a picture necessarily amounts to a twofold experience of the kind I’ve just 
described. Dominic Lopes and Jerrold Levinson broke this consensus.15 Levinson’s 
arguments are of particular significance in our context. In particular, he pointed out that 
not all seeing-in should be described as “aesthetic in character” and distinguished 
between (a) twofoldness as a necessary condition for the experience of pictures and (b) 
twofoldness as a necessary condition for the aesthetic appreciation of pictures. 
According to Levinson, b is true and a is false. Levinson denies the fact that whenever 																																																								15	Cf.	Lopes,	1996;	Levinson,	1998;	Nanay,	2005.	
we see, say, a woman in a picture we are always in some measure “attending to, taking 
notice of, or consciously focusing on the picture’s surface or patterning as such”.  
To some extent, Levinson’s distinction between (a) recognizing a depicted object 
and (b) the aesthetic appreciation of that depiction can be projected onto theatrical 
conceptual blending. Take, for instance, the difference between (a) simple impersonation 
and more or less complex (b) acting or representation. Accordingly, aesthetic 
appreciation of theatrical representations also involves “attending to, taking notice of, or 
consciously focusing on” the way the actor’s persona or physicality becomes 
instrumental in the implementation of a specific character. But that kind of attention is 
not necessarily involved in the mere recognition of which character is being played or 
which famous person is being impersonated. Indeed, just like aesthetic appreciation of a 
picture’s configuration involves, to some extent, going beyond the mere visual 
recognition, so too the complexities of the integration between the actor and the 
character’s mental spaces only become the focus of attention when the spectator departs 
from simple imitation. In an important sense, imitation is not representation.16 
Following Levinson’s criticism, Bence Nanay went back to Richard Wollheim’s 
original formulation of “seeing-in” and identified two different senses of twofoldness 
wrapped together: 
1) Twofoldness of the experience of a painting means that one is visually 
aware of the (two-dimensional) surface and the (three-dimensional) 
represented object simultaneously – which corresponds to Levinson’s 
stage of recognition of the depicted object. 
2) Twofoldness of the experience of a painting means that one attends to 
(takes notice of, consciously focuses on) of the represented object and 
the way it is represented simultaneously – which corresponds to 
Levinson’s stage of aesthetic appreciation of the painting.17 
Nanay considers that the two senses should be kept apart and argues – to my 
view convincingly - that twofoldness in the second sense is a necessary condition for the 
aesthetic appreciation of pictures (a point Levinson also maintains) whereas twofoldness 
in the first sense is a necessary condition for recognizing a depicted object (something 
																																																								16	Just	like	there	is	room	to	defend	that	“trompe	l’oeil	paintings	are	not	pictorial	representations”,	as	Wollheim	does	(cf.	Nanay,	2005:	254).	“[I]t	is	not	necessarily	the	case	that	the	more	effective	the	illusion,	the	better	the	play.	(...)	Breaking	the	spell,	or	manipulating	its	intensity,	may	well	be	part	of	a	successful	performance.”	(Stern,	2008:	64).		17	Nanay,	2005:	256.	
Levinson denies).18 Also, notice that twofoldness in the first sense does not require 
“attending to, taking notice of, or consciously focusing on” the surface of painting 
whereas twofoldness in the second sense does require that attitude towards “the way 
something is represented”. 
Roughly adapting this debate to the theatrical environment, this segmented 
experience, from the twofold experience of surface and represented object to the 
twofold experience of represented object and the way it is represented, would produce a 
parallel distinction: 
1) Twofoldness in theatre means that one is aware 19  of the actor’s 
physicality and the represented character simultaneously,  
2) Conceptual blending in theatre means that one attends to the 
represented character and the way it is represented simultaneously.  
 
The first sense corresponds to a simple recognition of the character and is 
present in a simple act of imitation of a given character - fictional or real. Arguably, this 
could also account for what Tom Stern calls the Houdini-type illusions in theatre, such as 
the stage slap.20 
Wollheim’s argument in favour of 1) in pictorial twofoldness is worth pursuing in 
theatrical terms: 
 
 “[A] salient fact about our perception of representations (…) is that any move 
that the spectator makes from the (…) standard viewing-point does not (…) necessarily 
bring about perspectival distortion. Under changes of viewing point the image remains 
remarkably free from deformation (…). The explanation offered of this constancy is 
that the spectator is, and remains, visually aware not only of what is represented but also 
of the surface qualities of the representation.”21 
 
Thus, if the argument holds, constancy in pictorial recognition requires 
twofoldness in sense 1. The argument points out to the simple fact that recognizing 
something in a painting is different from recognizing something in the real world.22 
When asked to touch the object shown in a photograph, the viewer will not try to reach 																																																								18	Cf.	Nanay,	2005:	252.	19	Of	course,	the	exact	nature	of	this	awareness	is	doubtful:	is	it	visual,	is	it	conceptual?	20	“In	the	case	of	the	stage	‘slap’,	the	actors	behave	in	such	a	way	the	the	audience	thinks	that	something	has	taken	place	when,	in	fact,	it	hasn’t.”	(Stern,	2014:	61)	21	Wollheim,	1998:	215-216.	22	Nanay,	2005:	254.	
through the photograph to touch it. She merely touches the surface of the photograph 
because awareness of the surface is a constitutive element of her recognizing the object 
in the photograph. Similarly, in theatre one could argue that the process of recognizing 
the character via the actor is different from recognizing a real person. Namely because 
spectators are fully aware that “actors pretend to perform various kinds of illocutionary 
acts rather than genuinely performing them.”23 This implies, first, that spectators are 
aware that actors don’t have appropriate illocutionary intentions or are under some sort 
of Gricean “sincerity obligations” (an assertion on the part of the character cannot does 
not lead the spectator to think that the actor is making that assertion). Second, because 
actors are not identified as making genuine illocutionary acts spectators have no reason 
to believe that the actors’ utterances are caused by anything other than the script. It is 
ultimately this awareness of pretension that holds the representational constancy and 
makes it possible for the spectator to step back from the actor / character blend and still 
keep attention to the way the character adheres to the actor’s persona – just like moving 
away from the painting’s centre of projection does not cause in the viewer any additional 
sense of distortion. 
Twofoldness in the second sense corresponds to a “higher-order mental activity” 
and in theatre that would correspond to a more reflexive attention to the actor’s ability 
and, curiously enough, depends on a certain degree of blending out of the 
actor/character mental space. Unlike simple imitation, the aesthetic value of this second 
twofoldness seems to depend on the way the actor deviates from stereotypes and 
tradition in the rendering of the character. That would explain why complex and 
unexpected role-playing is more aesthetically rewarding than formulaic impersonations: it 
mandates from the spectator a more demanding conceptual blending and provides a 
richer twofold experience in the second sense. The way the character is represented 
becomes constitutive of the spectator’s awareness of the character instead of the other 
way around. Among other things, I propose that through twofoldness in this second 
sense, the spectator is able to discern the particular attitude of the actor vis-à-vis the 
character he is impersonating, including his personal moral or political stance on the 
issues raised by the character, his philosophical understanding of the play, or even his 
																																																								23	Alward,	2009:	321.	Alward	holds	his	“illocutionary	pretence	view”	against	Gregory	Currie’s	“theatrical	illocution	account”	–	“actors	hold	the	illocutionary	intention	of	making	the	listener	imagine	or	make	believe	the	proposition	expressed	by	her	utterance”	(2009:	323)	–	and	David	Saltz’s	game	model	account	–	actors	adopt	some	game	intentions	and	following	these	intentions	“genuinely	perform	the	whole	gamut	of	illocutionary	actions”	(2009:	325).	
overall existential standpoint within the constraints of that particular role-playing.24 This 
requires an effort of blend-out but still maintaining awareness of the character that is 
being actively reformulated as the actor unravels his interpretation: it is, after all, his take 
on that character that the spectator is attending to. 
I would like to argue at this point that in theatrical twofoldness in the second 
sense, what is represented supervenes on the traits of the actor that lead to the 
recognition of the character and is perfectly compatible with conceptual blending – this 
is the mimesis-imitation level. But in twofoldness in the second sense – which is 
“aesthetic in nature” – it is the character that is being represented that supervenes on the 
way it is represented – the mimesis-imagination level.25  
 
4. Final remarks 
  
Our attention to theatrical fiction is never binary, continuously switching on and 
off. It works in layers and in relation with other assessments of what is real. It is a kind 
of dialectic blending: we accept something as real; with proper timing we tend to reject it 
as such; some other representation comes along that looks and feels more real than the 
previous one; for a moment, it is real; with proper timing, that too subsides into the 
artificial and something else comes along. It is not so much a question of providing the 
spectator with a tool for stepping out of the blend but a question of grasping yet another 
aspect of reality and turn it into a scaffolding for the fictional flow. 
Pirandello is a recent production of the Portuguese company Mala Voadora. The 
award winner stage design is uncanny. We see at first a large backdrop with a bi-
dimensional painting of two twin houses. We are given some time to exhaust the 
potential verisimilitude. Then the backdrop disappears and we are presented with the 
same two houses in a three dimensional lifelike setting. In comparison with the first 
representation, this is more verisimilar and for a moment it may even be mistaken for the 
real thing. When this suggestion gets exhausted, another model with the house’s indoor 
is produced. Immediately occurs the same effect of an apparent upgrade in verisimilitude, 
mimesis, or conceptual integration. The game could be carried on with a 1:1 scale 																																																								24	I	adopt	here	a	view	of	aesthetic	experience	close	to	that	of	Noël	Carroll:	“aesthetic	experience	is	a	matter	of	attending	with	understanding	to	the	way	in	which	the	point	or	purposes	of	an	artwork	is	embodied	or	presented”	(Carroll,	2012:	177).	I	think	that	theatrical	conceptual	blending,	but	in	particular	the	exercise	of	“blending	out”,	constitutes	an	important	cognitive	tool	towards	attending	with	understanding	to	the	way	the	work	embodies	its	content.	As	a	matter	of	fact	it	looks	like	a	suitable	epitome	of	aesthetic	experience.	25	Cf.	Stern,	2014:	24.	
photograph of those same two houses. And if for argument sake, the stage could be 
finally removed and we could see those two houses in the landscape, we would 
eventually end up by judging them to be fictional. In a way, this is theatre’s way of 
settling the score with Plato as if theatre becomes the tool that ends up revealing the veil 
of appearance of reality. The world is a stage but we only get to know this after watching 
the stage as a world. 
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